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UPDATES FROM THE international CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia
Trial Chamber Orders Investigation
of the Prosecutor in Šešelj Case
On June 29, 2010, Trial Chamber III
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ordered
an independent investigation into allegations of witness intimidation raised against
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in
the case of Vojislav Šešelj. The Motion
for Contempt, filed by Šešelj on March
23, 2007, alleges that ICTY prosecutors,
Carla Del Ponte, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff,
and Daniel Saxon, are responsible for,
among other allegations, threatening, illegally paying, and blackmailing witnesses.
Evaluating how the ICTY applies its rules
of procedure in this case offers insight into
the tribunal’s developing jurisprudence on
contempt of court proceedings, particularly
those implicating the OTP.
Šešelj himself has been subject to allegations of witness intimidation. On July 24,
2009, Trial Chamber II convicted Šešelj of
contempt for violating protective measures granted to witnesses, and sentenced
him to fifteen months imprisonment. Trial
Chamber II held that by disclosing information identifying three protected witnesses in a book published on his website,
Šešelj violated Rule 77(A)(ii) of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. His
was the first contempt case tried at the
ICTY against a defendant already on trial
for war crimes. Prior to the conclusion of
proceedings before the Appeals Chamber,
on February 4, 2010, Trial Chamber II
issued an order for additional contempt
charges related to information in his book
that potentially identifies eleven other protected witnesses. The Appeals Chamber
upheld Trial Chamber II’s decision in the
initial contempt case on May 19, 2010.
The second contempt case against Šešelj
remains in the pre-trial stage.
Šešelj filed a motion for contempt
against the OTP on March 23, 2007. The
trial chamber stayed Šešelj’s motion for
contempt on May 15, 2007 to avoid delay
of trial. Trial Chamber III reconsidered its

decision after hearing multiple witnesses
testify to intimidation and pressure from
the OTP during the prosecution’s preliminary interviews. The trial chamber acted,
sua sponte, to invoke Rule 77(C)(ii) of the
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
which states: “Where the Prosecutor, in
the view of the Chamber, has a conflict
of interest with respect to the relevant
conduct, direct the Registrar to appoint an
amicus curiae to investigate the matter and
report back to the Chamber as to whether
there are sufficient grounds for instigating
contempt proceedings.” The trial chamber
directed the registrar to appoint an amicus
curiae investigator to look into Šešelj’s
allegations and report back within six
months.
Although the ICTY’s system for investigating and adjudicating contempt of
court in witness intimidation cases lacks
the benefits of decades of refinement,
its procedural rules provide a framework
for addressing these allegations. Article
77 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence provides mechanisms for
addressing witness intimidation perpetrated by any persons “who knowingly
and willfully interfere with its administration of justice.” The power to try
contempt of court in the ICTY and other
international criminal tribunals is derived
from a tribunal’s inherent power, an AngloAmerican concept applied to international
courts.
While Šešelj’s case tested the ICTY’s
established process for holding contempt of
court proceedings, the tribunal’s procedure
for investigating the OTP is a distinct practice. The trial chamber broke new ground
by reconsidering Šešelj’s motion against
the OTP and initiating an investigation
of the prosecutors. In the past, the ICTY
has tried defendants, defense attorneys,
witnesses, and the ICTY’s former spokesperson for contempt using its standard procedure. However, this is the first time that
the ICTY has ordered an amicus curiae to
investigate a former Chief Prosecutor. This
independent investigation has significant
potential to shape international criminal
jurisprudence if the trial chamber initiates
42

contempt proceedings against the OTP’s
Del Ponte, Uertz-Retzlaff, and Saxon.

Bosnian Court Upholds Croatian
Ruling Against Former Croatian
MP Under Bilateral Treaty
On September 29, 2010, the Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a domestic
court tasked with adjudicating war crimes,
upheld a Croatian Supreme Court verdict sentencing Branimir Glavaš, a former
major general in the Croatian Army and
former Croatian Member of Parliament,
to eight years in prison for war crimes.
On May 8, 2009, a Croatian district court
sentenced Glavaš to ten years in prison for
the torture and killing of Serb civilians in
his hometown of Osijek, Croatia during
the 1990s Balkan conflicts. The Croatian
Supreme Court later reduced his sentence
to eight years’ imprisonment. Immediately
following his conviction, Glavaš reportedly left Croatia, fleeing to Bosnia where
his dual citizenship protected him from
extradition. Bosnian police arrested Glavaš
on the basis of a bilateral treaty enacted
by Bosnia and Croatia in February 2010,
establishing mutual recognition of criminal
judgments. The Glavaš decision is significant in that it demonstrates a policy shift
among Balkan states towards cooperating to apprehend international fugitives.
The current level of cooperation between
these former Yugoslavian states is a far
cry from the extradition difficulties the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) encountered in
the early days of its mandate.
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia have only
recently established extradition and verdict
recognition treaties. In the past, individuals
convicted in the courts of one state often
used their dual citizenship as a means to
escape punishment in that state by fleeing
to neighboring countries in which they
have dual citizenship. For example, before
upholding Croatia’s ruling in the Glavaš
case, Bosnia and Herzegovina denied
Croatia’s request to extradite Glavaš. On
August 25, 2010, Croatia did extradite
Sretko Kalinić to Serbia based on an extradition agreement the two countries signed
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in June. As a result of this cooperation,
Kalinić was convicted in absentia for the
murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran
Đinđić in 2003.
While the emergence of criminal justice treaties between these Balkan countries, such as that which led to the arrest
of Glavaš, is a recent development, state
cooperation with the ICTY in investigating
and arresting indictees has been requisite
for the functioning of the tribunal since its
inception. The ICTY became operational
while the Yugoslav conflicts were still
ongoing, a time at which many political and military officials that would later
be found guilty of war crimes were still
operating with impunity. Croatia established its extradition treaty with the ICTY
in 1996 during the presidency of Franjo
Tuđman. Section IV of the Legislations
Implementing the ICTY Statute addresses
arrest and extradition of suspects to the
tribunal and declares that an “investigative
judge of the competent county court shall
. . . decide on the Tribunal’s warrant for
arrest of an accused,” essentially preserving Croatia’s power to decline an extradition request. However, while Tuđman facilitated transfers of Bosnian Croats to the
tribunal, including Tihomir Blaškić and
Zlatko Aleksovski in 1996, the Croatian
government maintained that the ICTY
lacked jurisdiction over Croatian military
exercises conducted in Croatian territory.
In her address to the UN Security Council
in 2000, former Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
referred to Croatia’s cooperation in previous years as a “policy of obstruction
and delay.” This view persisted until after
Tuđman’s death in 1999 and the election
of Ivo Sanader who, in 2004, facilitated
the surrenders of Ivan Čermak, Tuđman’s
Assistant Minister of Defense and Mladen
Markač, a former Croatian Army general
involved in Operation Storm, as well as
several other Bosnian Croats.
Extradition between Balkan states and
the ICTY has historically been a heavily
politicized issue. As of 2001, part of U.S.
aid to Serbia was conditional on Serbia’s
cooperation with the ICTY. As Croatia,
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina attempt
to join the European Union (EU), other
European states are making their support
contingent on cooperation with the ICTY.
When deciding whether to extradite
someone who is both a national hero
and an alleged war criminal, governments

often stall for years before succumbing to
external political pressure. In Croatia, Ante
Gotovina maintains some popular support
despite his alleged role in causing Serb
civilian casualties during Operation Storm.
Ratko Mladić, the former top-ranking general for the Republika Sprska, is regarded
by many in Serbia as a national hero
despite his alleged command responsibility for the Srebrenica genocide. Despite
Serbia’s professed inability to capture
Mladić, critics contend that Serbia has
been stalling for years and has had several opportunities to capture him. Critics
further allege that, as they did with the
arrest of Radovan Karadžić, Serbia could
continue to stall for years before succumbing to ICTY pressure. Some EU countries,
such as the Netherlands, see the capture
and extradition of Mladić by Serbia as a
necessary factor in establishing Serbia’s
cooperation with the ICTY. They demand
proof of cooperation before supporting
Serbia’s acceptance into the EU.
The Balkan states weigh different
domestic interests in cooperating with each
other than they do in cooperating with
the ICTY. The recent trend toward bilateral cooperation is reflective of significant
sociopolitical changes in the Balkans since
the end of the conflict, and in response to
criminals convicted in state courts finding impunity in bordering countries. Thus,
countries resolved to end impunity out
of mutual domestic interest. Distinctly,
state cooperation with the ICTY involves
states weighing domestic political interests
against their desire to appeal to the international community. In the past, states often
valued protecting national heroes and politicians accused of war crimes above international cooperation. For Serbia, Croatia,
and Bosnia and Herzegovia, the economic
benefits of joining the EU have created a
significant incentive to cooperate with the
ICTY. As such, increased cooperation with
the ICTY in recent years and the upsurge
in cooperation between Balkan states are
motivated by different factors. Because
different motivating factors support cooperation with the ICTY than support bilateral cooperation, the problems the ICTY
initially faced in implementing extradition
treaties are unlikely to be present in implementing bilateral cooperation.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia for the Human Rights Brief.
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International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Security Council Amends ICTR
Statute to Promote Fulfillment of
Completion Strategy
On May 28, 2010, the President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), Judge Dennis Byron, submitted
the tribunal’s biannual report, S/2010/259,
to the UN Security Council detailing the
ICTR’s recent progress and challenges in
fulfilling its completion strategy. The ICTR
recognized that a shortage of judges and
staff has affected its ability to efficiently
conduct fair trials and deliver timely judgments. In response to the ICTR’s report, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1932
(2010) to extend the terms of permanent
and ad litem judges and amend Article 12
ter of the ICTR Statute. Amended Article
12 ter permits the Secretary-General to
“appoint a former permanent or ad litem
judge of the International Tribunal or of
the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia [(ICTY)], to serve as an ad
litem judge in the Trial Chambers for one or
more trials.” Although the ad litem model
is not ideal, a comparison of the remedies
for ad litem judge shortages provided to
the ICTY and ICTR demonstrates that
the amendment of Article 12 ter reflects
the Security Council’s desire to accelerate
ICTR proceedings, and will likely be effective at this point in the ICTR’s history.
The Security Council originally permitted ad litem judges in the ICTY and ICTR
so the tribunals could expedite fulfillment of their completion strategies. Daryl
Mundis, Office of the Prosecutor Senior
Trial Attorney at the ICTY, suggests that
the adoption of completion strategies by
the ad hoc criminal tribunals has resulted
in the justification, in part, of policies that
would otherwise not have been implemented. The creation of ad litem judge
pools seems to be one such policy. Ideally,
permanent judges would preside over all
cases because they can most effectively
preserve institutional memory, which is
particularly important given the length and
complexity of the tribunals’ cases. In comparison, ad litem judges may not provide
the same level of continuity during and
between cases. Nevertheless, the Security
Council adopted the ad litem model in
response to shortages of permanent judges,
but shortages of ad litem judges ensued.
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While the statutes of the ICTY and
ICTR contain many similar provisions, the
amended Article 12 ter of the ICTR Statute
differs considerably from the comparable
article of the ICTY Statute, Article 13 ter.
In 2005, the Security Council amended
the ICTY Statute to permit reelection of
ad litem judges, a practice previously prohibited under Article 13 ter (1)(e). The
amended ICTR Statute did not change
the language of Article 12 ter to permit
the reelection of ad litem judges. Instead,
Article 12 ter (3) was added, which permits
the Secretary-General to appoint a former
ICTR or ICTY ad litem judge “if there
are no ad litem judges remaining on the
roster or if no ad litem judge on the roster
is available for appointment, and if it is not
possible to assign a judge currently serving
at the International Tribunal . . . .”
The Security Council’s decision to add
a paragraph to Article 12 ter of the ICTR
Statute rather than amend its existing provisions was likely influenced by the near
completion of the ICTR’s mandate. The
ICTR aims to complete all trial proceedings by the end of 2011 and all appeals
proceedings by the end of 2013, if no
additional indictees are arrested. By contrast, the ICTY aims to render all judgments by the end of 2012. Anticipating
a longer period during which the need
to fill ad litem judge vacancies might
arise, the Security Council amended the
ICTY Statute in 2005 to permit the reelection, rather than appointment, of ad litem
judges. However, the amendments to the
ICTR Statute will likely apply for only two
to three years. The language of Article 12
ter (3) removes the ICTR’s reliance on the
nomination and election processes of ad
litem judges as detailed in Article 12 ter
(1). Under Article 12 ter (1), at least thirtysix judges must be nominated by Member
States, from which eighteen judges are
elected by the General Assembly. Article
12 ter (3) allows the ICTR to circumvent
these requirements and thus, serves as an
efficient mechanism for filling ad litem
judge vacancies as they arise.
In his October 8, 2010 speech before
the UN General Assembly Judge Byron
stated, “the Tribunal’s achievements will
be ultimately judged by the quality of its
trials and judgments and by the efficiency
of its judicial management.” While the ad
litem model is not the most ideal long-term
solution to judge shortages in international criminal tribunals, the amendment

to Article 12 ter of the ICTR Statute is an
appropriate solution to the ICTR’s current
ad litem judge shortage. In light of the
Security Council’s clear desire to expedite
ICTR proceedings, and the impending fulfillment of the tribunal’s completion strategy, the amended ad litem procedure will
likely be effective.

Appeals Chamber Restricts
Immunity of Defense Counsel
On October 6, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a
decision concerning the extent of immunity afforded to ICTR defense counsel.
On May 28, 2010, Rwandan authorities
arrested defense counsel Peter Erlinder
for allegedly violating Rwanda’s genocide
denial laws. Erlinder represents defendant Aloys Ntabakuze in the Bagosora
et al case currently before the ICTR.
Members of the international community
protested Erlinder’s arrest, and other ICTR
defense lawyers threatened to boycott proceedings before the tribunal. Ntabakuze
filed a motion requesting that the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTR order the Rwandan
government to immediately release
Erlinder and stop all proceedings against
him. Also, in accordance with advice from
the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the ICTR
requested the Rwandan government to
“formally assert immunity” for Erlinder,
and to release him immediately, on the
basis of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the UN (CPIUN), to
which Rwanda is a party. The High Court
of Rwanda released Erlinder for health
reasons on June 17, 2010, but ordered that
investigations into his case continue.
In its October decision, the Appeals
Chamber denied Erlinder full immunity from liability under Rwandan law,
thereby permitting the Prosecutor General
of Rwanda to continue its investigation.
Although the Appeals Chamber’s decision
limiting the immunity provided to defense
counsel corresponds with the provisions of
the CPIUN and the practices of other international courts, in practice, the decision
raises challenges, particularly concerning
possible infringements on the rights of the
accused.
Section 22(b) of the CPIUN accords
experts performing missions for the UN,
including ICTR defense counsel, immunity
from legal process “in respect of words
44

spoken or written and acts done by them
in the course of the performance of their
mission,” even after the termination of
their employment on UN missions. ICTR
defense attorney Kate Gibson suggests
this clause can, and perhaps should be
interpreted as granting blanket immunity
from legal process to ICTR defense counsel in any country that is a signatory to the
CPIUN. This broad interpretation is undesirable because of policy considerations
such as the possible exploitation of the limitless protection under blanket immunity.
Additionally, the purpose of granting counsel immunity is not to eliminate accountability for possible violations of national
laws; rather, it is to ensure the smooth
operation of the tribunal. As Section 20 of
the CPIUN states, “immunities are granted
to officials in the interests of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit of
the individuals themselves.”
Because it would not be tailored to
serve the purposes of the UN mission,
granting full immunity to defense counsel
is not appropriate. However, restricting
immunity raises challenges as well. In their
Statement and Appeal to Rwanda, ICTR
defense attorneys noted that Erlinder’s
detention and prosecution “seriously compromises [their] missions by undermining
[their] independence and by preventing
the carrying out of [their] duties” at the
ICTR. The Bagasora et al case is currently
awaiting a hearing on appeal, for which all
documents have been filed, but no date has
yet been assigned. Therefore, Erlinder’s
arrest did not prevent the other members
of the defense team from carrying out their
duties. However, in many other situations,
the arrest of defense counsel would impede
a defense team’s work on a case, especially
at the pre-trial or trial stages. The defense
counsel’s restricted ability to carry out his
or her duties could infringe on the rights
of the accused, as described in Articles 19
and 20 of the ICTR Statute, particularly
the right to a fair and expeditious trial.
Restricting defense counsels’ immunity
from legal action could also be problematic if a state’s laws are not consistent with
international norms. For instance, if an
ICTR defense lawyer is arrested pursuant
to a state’s domestic law that infringes on
basic human rights, state sovereignty generally precludes the tribunal from compelling the state to release the lawyer.
The Appeals Chamber’s ruling reflects
the general practice of international courts
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to limit defense counsel’s immunity from
liability under national laws. Article 30
of the ICTY Statute is nearly identical to
Article 29 of the ICTR Statute, both of
which provide that immunities afforded to
the judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar,
and related staff, of the tribunals are those
included in the CPIUN. Additionally,
Article 18(b) of the Agreement on

the Privileges and Immunities of the
International Criminal Court incorporates
provisions that are nearly identical to those
included in Article VI Section 22(b) of the
CPIUN, as discussed above. The case of
Erlinder’s arrest presented an international
tribunal the first opportunity to clarify the
boundaries of defense counsel immunity.
Although the Appeals Chamber’s deci-

Judgment Summaries: International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

the group’s members with weapons and
contributed to looting throughout the city.

Judgment Summary: The Prosecutor v.
Ephrem Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-T
On February 25, 2010, Trial Chamber
I at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda issued its judgment in Prosecutor
v. Ephrem Setako. The indictment charged
Setako with six counts: genocide or complicity in genocide; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity; and
serious violations (violence to life and pillaging) of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
The Trial Chamber found Setako guilty of
genocide, extermination as a crime against
humanity, and violence to life as a war
crime and sentenced him to twenty-five
years of imprisonment.
Setako was born in 1949 in Nkuli
commune in the Ruhengeri prefecture of
Rwanda. He began his career as a military officer and eventually obtained the
rank of lieutenant colonel. After graduating with a degree in law in 1977, he began
working with the Ministry of Defense
in Kigali. Following the signing of the
Arusha Accords in August 1993, Setako
was appointed to head the Rwandan delegation of the Neutral Military Observers
Group of the Organization of African Unity
(NMOG). In 1994, he attained the level of
head of the Division of Legal Affairs within
the Ministry of Defense. According to the
indictment, in this capacity, Setako participated in a meeting with several prominent national and local personalities for
the purpose of planning and carrying out
the extermination of Tutsis following the
death of President Habyarimana on April 6,
1994. Setako’s alleged involvement in the
ensuing conflict included calling on militiamen to kill Tutsis and congratulating the
killers afterwards. The Prosecution further
asserted that in Kigali, Setako acted as the
unofficial liaison officer to the prefecture’s
Interhamwe and, in that capacity, supplied

In its factual findings, the Trial
Chamber determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that Setako was involved in two
separate instances of killing: the killing
of thirty to forty Tutsis who had taken
refuge at the Mukamira Military Camp on
April 25, 1994, and the killing of nine or
ten additional Tutsi refugees at the same
camp on May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber
found that Setako, along with other prominent authorities, addressed a large gathering of recruits and other soldiers at the
camp in Ruhengeri prefecture on April 25.
According to one witness, Setako stated
during his address that “Tutsis and their
accomplices needed to be hunted down.”
Another witness testified that Setako
“expressed surprise that Tutsis had taken
refuge at the camp since they were being
killed elsewhere.” That night, some thirty
to forty Tutsis living at the camp were
shot. The Trial Chamber further found that
Setako returned to the Mukamira camp
on May 11, 1994 with approximately ten
Tutsis and told an officer at the camp to
kill them. That night, the ten captive Tutsis
were killed.
The Trial Chamber determined that the
accused ordered the crimes on both April
25 and May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber
held that Setako’s position as a lieutenant
colonel who hailed from the area provided
him authority at the camp and that his
speech calling for the killing of Tutsis on
April 25, in addition to his instructions to
kill the ten Tutsis he brought to the camp,
established that he ordered the murders.
The Trial Chamber further found that the
proximity of the killings to Setako’s actions
at the camp on both dates indicated that
his instructions substantially contributed
to the killings. Lastly, the Trial Chamber
determined that the “content of Setako’s
interventions” at the camp established that
he acted with genocidal intent in relation to the killings. Accordingly, the Trial
45

sion reflects conventional international
law and practice, restricting the immunity
of defense counsel, nevertheless, remains
controversial.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda for the Human Rights Brief.

Chamber found Setako guilty of genocide
for ordering the killings on both April 25
and May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber did
not consider the second charge of complicity to commit genocide because it was
alleged in the alternative.
On the charge of extermination as a
crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber
determined that the killings on April 25,
1994 were carried out as part of a broader,
widespread or systematic attack against
civilian Tutsis on the basis of their ethnicity. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber held
that Setako’s act of ordering the killing of
thirty to forty refugees amounted to extermination, which is the act of killing “on a
large scale.” No charge of extermination as
a crime against humanity was alleged with
regard to the events of May 11, 1994.
Finally, in relation to the charge
of violence to life as a war crime, the
Trial Chamber found that the violence
between the Rwandan armed forces and
the Rwandan Patriotic Front constituted a
non-international armed conflict during the
period of time covered by the indictment. It
further found that Setako and the assailants
who committed the killings at Mukamira
camp acted in furtherance of the existing
armed conflict or under its guise. At the
same time, the Trial Chamber found that
the victims at Mukamira camp were civilians who had taken refuge with their family
members at the camp and were not taking
active part in the hostilities. Consequently,
the Trial Chamber held Setako guilty of
violence against life as a serious violation
of Common Article 3 and of Additional
Protocol II based on his order to kill the
Tutsis at the camp.
The Trial Chamber dismissed the
charges of murder as a crime against
humanity and pillage as a war crime in
relation to the events at Mukamira camp
because the Prosecution failed to establish
Setako’s involvement beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Trial Chamber also dismissed
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the allegation that Setako bore responsibility for the killings at Mukamira camp, as
well as other killings of Tutsis, on the basis
of a joint criminal enterprise, because the
Prosecution failed to present convincing
evidence to demonstrate that Setako participated in any meetings or crimes other
than the incidents at the Mukamira camp
on April 25 and May 11, 1994. Similarly,
the Trial Chamber dismissed allegations
that Setako bore criminal responsibility
as a superior for acts of Rwandan army
soldiers, the local Hutu civilian population, and militia members, because the
Prosecution presented insufficient evidence that Setako exercised effective control over the perpetrators of any crimes
other than those that took place on April
25 and May 11, 1994. While the Chamber
recognized that Setako’s rank as lieutenant
colonel in the Rwandan army indicated his
influence and authority, his rank alone was
insufficient to establish superior responsibility. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber
found no evidence that Setako’s position
as the head of the division of legal affairs
at the Ministry of Defense entitled him to
legal authority over members of the armed
forces or other segments of society, apart
from his section at the Ministry. The Trial
Chamber dismissed allegations of Setako’s
superior responsibility for the events at
Mukamira camp because he was directly
responsible for ordering the crimes, and it
would be impermissible to enter convictions on both bases of responsibility for the
same crimes.
In sentencing, the Prosecution argued
that the Trial Chamber should impose a
sentence of imprisonment for life because
Setako played a prominent role in the
crimes and abused his authority. In addition, the Prosecution claimed that Setako’s
offenses were grave and that there were no
mitigating factors. The Defense requested
that Setako be allowed the fullest benefit of
mitigating factors reflected, including his
lengthy public service to his country. The
Trial Chamber concluded that although
Setako’s crimes were grave, his crimes did
not merit the most serious sanction available under the Statute because the evidence
did not show that Setako was a main architect of the majority of the crimes committed in Ruhengeri prefecture. Accordingly,
the Trial Chamber sentenced Setako to a
single sentence of twenty-five years of
imprisonment.

Zsofia Young, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Susana SáCouto, Director of the War Crimes
Research Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary,
Assistant Director of the War Crimes Research
Office, edited this summary for the Human
Rights Brief.

Judgment Summary: The Case of Simon
Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A
On March 18, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered its
judgment in the case of Simon Bikindi,
who was sentenced by Trial Chamber III
to a term of fifteen years imprisonment
for direct and public incitement to commit genocide pursuant to Articles 2(3)(c)
and 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
The Trial Chamber based its conviction on
evidence that Bikindi issued public exhortations to kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove
road towards the end of June 1994. Bikindi
is a former composer and singer, and previously worked at the Ministry of Youth and
Association Movements of the Government
of Rwanda. Bikindi appealed both his conviction and his sentence, requesting that his
sentence either be overturned or reduced.
The Prosecution also lodged an appeal
against the Trial Chamber’s sentence, arguing that Bikindi’s conviction warranted
life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber
ultimately dismissed all appeals from both
the Prosecution and the Defense, affirming the Trial Chamber’s sentence of fifteen
years in prison.
The Appeals Chamber began by addressing Bikindi’s fifth ground of appeal, which
alleged that his prospects for acquittal suffered as a consequence of the “ineffective
assistance” and “gross incompetence and/
or gross negligence” of his defense counsel
during the cross-examination of witness
AKJ, a critical witness to the Prosecution’s
case. Pursuant to Article 20(4)(d) of the
Statute, an accused retains the right to
be represented by competent counsel.
However, as the Appeals Chamber reiterated, all counsel working with the ICTR
enjoy the presumption of competence, and
thus the accused bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating incompetence sufficient to occasion a miscarriage of justice.
Furthermore, Article 19(1) of the Statute
requires that the accused bring any alleged
violation before the Trial Chamber. Failing
46

that, an accused must demonstrate that their
counsel’s incompetence was sufficiently
manifest that the Trial Chamber was under
a duty to intervene. Here, Bikindi failed
to bring the alleged violation to the attention of the Trial Chamber, so he bore the
burden of establishing on appeal that the
Trial Chamber was obliged to intervene
and failed to do so. However, based on the
record, the Appeals Chamber concluded
that Bikindi failed to meet this burden, and
accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Next, the Appeals Chamber addressed
Bikindi’s first and second grounds of
appeal, which related to alleged errors on
the part of the Trial Chamber in relying on
the testimony of two witnesses – witnesses
AKK and AKJ – to reach its conclusion
that the appellant made exhortations to
kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove road.
Specifically, Bikindi claimed error on the
grounds that, inter alia, the Trial Chamber
relied on certain portions of witness AKK’s
testimony, despite having found other portions of the same witness’s testimony to be
unreliable. In addition, Bikindi complained
that the Trial Chamber improperly found
the testimonies of the two witnesses corroborated each other, even though there
were certain inconsistencies between the
two testimonies. With regard to the first
alleged error, the Appeals Chamber held
that, as a general matter, “it is not unreasonable for a Trial Chamber to accept
certain parts of a witness’s testimony and
reject others.” Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber made clear, the Trial Chamber
is not required to “set out in detail why
it accepted or rejected particular parts
of a witness’s testimony.” The Appeals
Chamber also rejected the notion that the
lower court erred in finding that the two
witnesses’ testimonies corroborated one
another, recalling an earlier holding that
“two testimonies corroborate one another
when one prima facie credible testimony
is compatible with the other prima facie
credible testimony regarding the same fact
or a sequence of linked facts.” It is not
necessary, the Chamber stressed, that the
testimonies be “identical in all aspects or
describe the same fact in the same way,”
as each witness presents what he observed
from his particular view at the time of
the relevant events. Overall, therefore, the
Appeals Chamber found that a reasonable
trier of fact could have relied on witnesses
AKK’s and AKJ’s testimonies when deter-
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mining Bikindi’s culpability and dismissed
these grounds of appeal.
Another grounds for appeal raised by
Bikindi was that the Trial Chamber erred
by failing to take judicial notice of several
facts related to Operation Turquoise, a
United Nations humanitarian operation.
According to Bikindi, Operation Turquoise
troops would have been on the very road
allegedly used by Bikindi to guide the convoy from which he made his public exhortations to kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove
road. The Appeals Chamber agreed with
Bikindi that the Trial Chamber erred when
it refused the Defense’s request for judicial
notice on the grounds that the request was
not timely. However, the Appeals Chamber
also determined that the relevant facts were
not capable of being judicially noticed, and
therefore the error of the Trial Chamber did
not invalidate the decision.
Next, the Appeals Chamber turned to
Bikindi’s claim that the lower court erred in
its assessment of evidence presented by the
Defense. In particular, Bikindi submitted,
inter alia, that the Trial Chamber made an
“unequal choice of factors” in considering
the close relationship between him and
defense witnesses, while failing to consider
that “a good proportion of these witnesses
were Tutsi victims themselves” and had
good reason to give evidence of Bikindi’s
guilt. However, the Appeals Chamber
noted that the Trial Chamber enjoys broad
discretion when assessing the weight of
certain pieces of evidence. Furthermore,
the Appeals Chamber was satisfied that
the Trial Chamber fulfilled its duty to consider all relevant factors with regard to the
credibility of the witnesses presented by
the Defense. The Appeals Chamber similarly deferred to the discretion of the Trial
Chamber in assessing Bikindi’s sixth and
final ground of appeal with regard to his
conviction, namely that the Trial Chamber
erred in concluding that Bikindi was an
influential member of both the National
Republican Movement for Democracy and
Development and the Interahamwe, and
that given his stature, Bikindi was fully
aware of the impact of his public exhortations. According to the Appeals Chamber,
it was fully within the Trial Chamber’s
discretion, as the primary trier of fact, to
make findings as to Bikindi’s perceived
influence or authority, based on the totality
of evidence presented.

Turning to the challenges from the
Prosecution and Defense regarding the
length of Bikindi’s sentence, the Appeals
Chamber began with Bikindi’s claims that
a sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment is disproportionate to the gravity of
the offense, is manifestly excessive, and is
unduly harsh. First, the Appeals Chamber
noted that, although the Trial Chambers
do have broad discretion in determining
the appropriate sentence, Article 24 of the
Statute nonetheless allows the Appeals
Chamber to “affirm, reverse or revise”
the sentence imposed, based on such factors as: (1) the gravity of the offense;
(2) the individual circumstances of the
convicted person, including any aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3)
the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda; and (4)
the extent to which any sentence imposed
on the defendant by a court of any State
for the same act has already been served.
As a general rule, however, the Appeals
Chamber affirmed that it will not challenge an imposed sentence in favor of its
own unless it had been demonstrated that
the Trial Chamber committed a discernible
error in exercising its discretion, or failed
to follow the applicable law. The burden is
on the appellant to affirmatively establish
the error. For his part, Bikindi contended,
inter alia, that the offense for which he was
convicted should not be considered a crime
of similar gravity to genocide and thus
warranted a lighter sentence. According to
Bikindi, the sentence he received reflects
a determination that the two offenses have
been placed on the same footing. The
Appeals Chamber, however, explained that
there is no “hierarchy of crimes” within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that
each sentence is imposed on a case-bycase basis after considering the unique
circumstances at play. Bikindi also argued
that, absent established standards of sentencing, the practices of other international
tribunals or national courts should be considered. According to Bikindi, within those
jurisdictions, there is an emerging trend to
treat the crime of incitement to genocide
as an offense less severe than the crime of
genocide. However, the Appeals Chamber
noted that, pursuant to Article 23 of the
ICTR Statute, the Trial Chamber was not
obliged to consider the practices of other
jurisdictions other than Rwanda, which
does not treat direct and public incitement
to genocide more leniently than the crime
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of genocide. Lastly, Bikindi requested that
the Appeals Chamber consider mitigating
factors, particularly that Bikindi composed
songs promoting peace and that he had
in the past provided assistance to Tutsis.
With respect to the first factor, the Appeals
Chamber found that other compositions
were indisputably used to spread Hutu
Power ideology and rally perpetrators to
take action. With respect to the second
factor, the Appeals Chamber found that
Bikindi’s assistance was selective at best,
and that he only provided assistance to
those in his inner circle.
As for the Prosecution’s appeal seeking an increase in the sentence to life in
prison, the Appeals Chamber held that the
Prosecution failed to establish that the fifteen-year sentence was manifestly inadequate given the particular circumstances of
Bikindi’s offense, and thus it affirmed the
sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
wrote this judgment summary for the Human
Rights Brief. Susana SáCouto, Director of the
War Crimes Research Office, and Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for
the Human Rights Brief.

Judgment Summary: Siméon
Nchamihigo v. The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A
On March 18, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a judgment on an appeal by Siméon Nchamihigo.
Nchamihigo – a former deputy prosecutor
from Cyangugu prefecture – appealed his
conviction issued by Trial Chamber III
(Trial Chamber) on November 12, 2008.
The Trial Chamber convicted Nchamihigo
of genocide, murder as a crime against
humanity, extermination as a crime
against humanity, and other inhumane acts
as a crime against humanity, and sentenced Nchamihigo to life imprisonment.
Nchamihigo appealed the conviction on 36
grounds. Upholding nine of Nchamihigo’s
grounds for appeal, the Appeals Chamber
partially vacated the Trial Chamber’s findings and reduced Nchamihigo’s life sentence to a prison term of forty years.
Several of Nchamihigo’s successful
appeals related to the Trial Chamber’s reliance on the testimony of particular prosecu-
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tion witnesses, whose credibility had been
challenged by the defense. For instance,
Nchamihigo persuaded the Appeals
Chamber of the insufficiency of the Trial
Chamber’s reliance on the evidence of
one witness to establish that Nchamihigo
aided and abetted the killing of three
Tutsi girls at the Gatandara roadblock.
Specifically, according to the defense, the
Trial Chamber improperly relied upon the
uncorroborated testimony of Witness BRD,
in spite of the fact that BRD was previously
convicted for forgery and despite documentary evidence that challenged a key portion of the witness’s testimony. A majority
of the Appeals Chamber agreed, holding
that the lower court abused its discretion
in the assessment of BRD’s credibility.
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber found
that the Trial Chamber drew conclusions
that “so exceed[ed] the evidence” that they
called into question the reasonableness of
the Chamber’s inference that the accused
played a role in the murders. Based on
these errors, the Appeals Chamber quashed
Nchamihigo’s convictions for genocide and
murder as a crime against humanity to the
extent the convictions were based on these
three murders.
Notably, Judges Pocar and Liu dissented from the Appeals Chamber’s holding, recalling that it is fully within the
Trial Chamber’s discretion to determine
the appropriate weight to be accorded to
a witness’s testimony. They asserted that a
Trial Chamber may consider a number of
factors in assessing credibility, including
the witness’s demeanor while testifying,
his role in the event in question, the plausibility and clarity of his testimony, inconsistencies between the testimony and other
evidence, prior examples of false testimony, a motivation to lie, and the witness’s
responses under cross-examination. Noting
the Trial Chamber’s findings that Witness
BRD testified “in a forthright manner” and
“stood firm under cross-examination,” the
dissenting judges contended that the Trial
Chamber exercised due care in assessing
the witness’s credibility, and therefore the
Appeals Chamber must defer to its findings.
The Appeals Chamber rejected a general challenge by the defendant to the
Trial Chamber’s reliance on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. After looking

to the practice of other international criminal tribunals, including the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
as well as domestic courts, the Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber has
the discretion to rely on uncorroborated,
but otherwise reliable, testimony from any
witness, including accomplices, so long as
the Chamber treats accomplice evidence
with the necessary caution. According to
the Appeals Chamber, the “main question”
in evaluating the reliability of accomplice
evidence is “whether the witness concerned might have motives or incentives to
implicate the accused.”
However, Nchamihigo successfully
argued that the Trial Chamber erred in
relying on the uncorroborated testimony
of Witness BRK – an alleged accomplice
to Nchamihigo’s crimes – to support findings underlying the appellant’s convictions
for genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber
began its analysis by reiterating that, while
accomplice testimony “is not per se unreliable,” in assessing the probative value of
such evidence, “the Chamber is bound
to carefully consider the totality of the
circumstances in which it was tendered.”
The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber failed in its assessment of the
credibility of BRK’s evidence. Particularly
unsettling for the Appeals Chamber was
evidence that BRK awaited trial on charges
pertaining to his involvement in the same
incidents, suggesting BRK may have an
incentive to minimize his own involvement
and to place blame upon Nchamihigo.
Moreover, BRK was not at first forthright
in his testimony, and at trial he contradicted
his previous written statement about the
timing of the incidents in question. Based
on these factors, the Appeals Chamber
found that “no reasonable trier of fact
could have found Witness BRK to be credible.” Judge Pocar dissented on account of
his belief that the Trial Chamber exercised
due deference in its finding that the witness’s evidence was credible.
Witness credibility was not the only
reason that the Appeals Chamber granted
Nchamihigo’s appeals. For instance, the
Appeals Chamber overturned his conviction for instigating killings in Shangi par-
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ish because the indictment did not provide
Nchamihigo with sufficient notice of the
charges against him. Paragraph 20(a) of the
indictment accused Nchamihigo of supplying weapons to Interahamwe members en
route to kill Tutsis in Shangi parish. The
Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor
failed to prove this allegation, succeeding
only to establish that Nchamihigo “provided hospitality and encouragement to
them by nourishing them the night before
the attack.” The Appeals Chamber noted
that the indictment must announce charges
against the defendant with sufficient particularity, and that the Prosecutor is bound
at trial by the specific facts that he or she
alleges in the indictment. Thus, the Appeals
Chamber held that Nchamihigo “could not
have known on the basis of paragraph
20(a) of the Indictment that he was being
charged with instigating [the] Interahamwe
to kill Tutsis at Shangi parish by providing
them with hospitality and encouragement
the night before the attack.”
Lastly, the Appeals Chamber found
error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that
the appellant instigated killings in Hanika
parish. Witness testimony established conflicting accounts of Nchamihigo’s whereabouts on April 11 and 12, 1994, when
the massacre occurred. The Trial Chamber
adopted an interpretation of the testimony
that placed Nchamihigo in the parish at
critical times during those two days, and
convicted him of instigating the massacre.
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that
the Trial Chamber has broad discretion
for making factual determinations at the
trial level, but criticized the Trial Chamber
for not providing an adequate explanation
of its reasoning. The Appeals Chamber
explained that this deficient explanation
impeded the process of judicial review,
and required a reversal of the conviction
as a result.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Susana SáCouto, Director of the War Crimes
Research Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary,
Assistant Director of the War Crimes Research
Office, edited this summary for the Human
Rights Brief.
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International Criminal Court
Kenyans Question ICC Authority
On September 18, 2010 Kenyan Cabinet
Minister Mutula Kilonzo questioned the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC)
right to investigate and prosecute Kenyan
nationals for crimes committed during the
post-election violence. Days later, Kenyan
businessman Joseph Gathungu claimed
that allowing the ICC to launch an investigation would violate the country’s newlyratified constitution. While both Kilonzo
and Gathungu assert that the new constitution provides mechanisms sufficient to
carry out such an investigation, the ICC
has already determined that Kenya’s prior
inaction shows an unwillingness to do so.
The assertions come in the wake of the
ICC’s March 31, 2010 decision to initiate
an investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the Republic
of Kenya. The decision marked the first
time that the ICC prosecutor initiated an
investigation proprio motu (by one’s own
motion) under Article 15 of the Rome
Statute. Upon reviewing Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo’s submission, a majority
from Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the
Prosecutor’s request met the “reasonable
basis to proceed” set forth by Article 15(3)
of the Rome Statute. On September 21,
2010 the Prosecutor announced plans to
present two cases “against 4 to 6 individuals who according to the evidence, bear the
greatest responsibility for the most serious
crimes committed during Kenya’s 20072008 post election violence.”
Through its recent refusal to arrest
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir,
accused of committing genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity,
Kenya challenged the authority of the
ICC. Kenya’s failure to arrest Bashir is a
direct violation of the Rome Statute, the
treaty that established the ICC. Kenya
invited Bashir to attend the ceremony and
subsequent celebrations accompanying the
ratification of the Kenyan constitution on
August 27, 2010.
Kilonzo’s argument addresses the foundation of the ICC’s jurisdiction to launch
an investigation within Kenya. Regarding
the ICC’s upcoming investigation, Kilonzo
stated: “[W]e can say that Kenyan judges
meet the best international standards. After
that, I can even tell them not to admit
the ICC case. Why on earth should a

Kenyan go to The Hague?” This argument implicitly references Article 17 of the
Rome Statute pertaining to admissibility.
According to Article 17(1)(a), the ICC will
determine that a case is admissible if “the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”

jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the
crimes referred to in article 5.” In addition,
Article 86 provides: “States Parties shall,
in accordance with the provisions of this
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in
its investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”

Kilonzo’s statement implies that Kenya
is able to carry out an investigation or prosecution. In order to effectively challenge
the ICC’s jurisdiction, Kilonzo would have
to demonstrate that Kenya can fulfill both
the willing and able conditions, which may
be unlikely given Kenya’s lack of cooperation with the ICC to date. Even this could
prove fruitless, as the Pre-Trial Chamber,
in their March 2010 decision, cited the
Appeals Chamber, which said, “in case of
inaction, the question of unwillingness or
inability does not arise.” Even if he were
able to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber
that Kenya is capable of carrying out an
investigation, Kilonzo must still illustrate
Kenya’s willingness to do so.

The legal basis for Kilonzo’s argument, as well as Gathungu’s, is questionable. Kilonzo’s challenge does not address
Kenya’s failure to initiate an investigation
or prosecution, while Gathungu’s does not
comport with either to the Constitution
of Kenya or the Rome Statute. Perhaps
these arguments serve as an expression of
concern regarding the Prosecutor’s unprecedented use of proprio motu, or greater
overarching concerns with the ICC, but
they do not express sufficient reasons to
preclude the ICC from continuing its investigation of Kenya’s post-election violence.

Pursuing another avenue for legal
action, Gathungu filed a lawsuit before
Kenya’s High Court in which he stated
that Kenya’s new constitution does not
allow the ICC to conduct an investigation
in Kenya. His application goes on to say
that, because the ICC is not provided for
in Kenya’s Constitution, the court cannot
investigate crimes, or determine the guilt
of alleged criminals in Kenya. Gathungu’s
argument may find its genesis in Article
159(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, which
states: “Judicial authority is derived from
the people and vests in, and shall be exercised by, the courts and tribunals established by or under this Constitution.”
Gathungu’s assertion, however, is not
supported by a more thorough reading
of Kenya’s constitution. Article 2(6) of
the Constitution of Kenya provides: “Any
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya
shall form part of the law of Kenya under
this Constitution.” Because the Republic of
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute on March
15, 2005, Article 2(6) of the Constitution
requires that Kenya accept the ICC’s jurisdiction. Also, the Rome Statute provides
rules with regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction
over States Parties. Article 4(2) indicates
that “The Court may exercise its functions and powers . . . on the territory of
any State Party . . . .” Similarly, Article
12(1) states: “A State which becomes a
Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
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ICC Appeals Chamber Reverses
Lubanga Ruling
On October 8, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) reversed Trial Chamber I’s
July 8, 2010 decision to stay proceedings
in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, as well as the Trial Chamber’s July
15, 2010 decision to release the accused.
By doing so, the Appeals Chamber may
have begun to establish a precedent that
sanctions are the appropriate mechanism
to deal with the misconduct of an officer
of the court, rather than ordering a stay of
proceedings. The Chamber also decided
that Article 71 of the Rome Statute is
sometimes preferable to Articles 46 and 47
when sanctioning a prosecutor, in spite of
Articles 46 and 47’s explicit references to
prosecutors.
Trial Chamber I ruled that a fair trial
was no longer possible because Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo failed to adhere to
the Chamber’s orders to disclose the identity of intermediary 143 to Lubanga Dyilo
once protective measures were employed.
The Chamber later observed, “the accused
cannot be held in preventative custody
on a speculative basis,” and ordered him
released. The prosecutor appealed both
orders.
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber
found that Trial Chamber erred by resorting to a stay of proceedings, adding that
because the Trial Chamber’s decision to
release Lubanga Dyilo was based on the
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erroneous decision to stay proceedings,
the decision to release the accused also
had to be reversed. The Appeals Chamber
explained that if there is a “conflict
between the orders of a Chamber and the
Prosecutor’s perception of his duties, the
Prosecutor is obliged to comply with the
orders of the Chamber.”
The Appeals Chamber noted that the
Trial Chamber’s order to stay proceedings
was premature, and that sanctions as provided under Article 71 of the Rome Statute
were the proper mechanism by which a
Trial Chamber could maintain control
of proceedings. Article 71(1) allows the
court to “sanction persons present before it
who commit misconduct,” through means
provided in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
The Appeals Chamber’s decisions may
have contributed to the establishment of
a significant precedent: the Chamber is
likely to require an exhaustion of sanctions
before ordering a stay of proceedings. One
implication is that the outcome of a trial
before the ICC may not be directly affected
by the misconduct of an officer before the
court. This promotes the idea that some
matters of internal discipline — disciplinary measures taken against officers of the

court — at the ICC can be treated independently from the Chamber’s decisions
regarding the outcome of a trial. Even if
disciplinary measures lead to a prosecutor’s removal from the courtroom (or perhaps from the position itself), the Appeals
Chamber’s ruling indicates that this would
be preferable to a stay of proceedings
predicated on a prosecutor’s misconduct.
The Appeals Chamber may have also
set a controversial precedent with its decision to look to Article 71 to sanction the
Prosecutor. It is unclear whether Article 71
applies to the prosecutor in the first place.
Otto Triffterer’s Commentary on The Rome
Statute explains:
Persons present before the Court
in the sense of [A]rticle 71 are all
those not belonging to one of the
organs of the Court . . . . This narrow interpretation is confirmed
by the fact that articles 46 and 47
provide specific sanctions for misconduct of Judges, Prosecutors
and members of the Registry . . . .
Persons of these three groups are
protected by [A]rticle 71, however
. . . do not fall under [A]rticle 71
when committing a misconduct.
(Page 1351, Commentary on the
Rome Statute)
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It appears that Triffterer draws an appropriate distinction between Article 71 and
Articles 46 and 47, given that the former
makes no specific mention of the prosecutor. In looking to Article 71, the Appeals
Chamber may have unnecessarily complicated the process of sanctioning the
prosecutor.
By choosing not to apply Articles 46
and 47, the Appeals Chamber may have
created more confusion than clarity on the
issue of sanctioning an officer of the court.
It now seems unclear when it would be
appropriate to use Articles 46 and 47. The
distinction between Articles 46 and 47 and
Article 71 does not lie in the magnitude of
the offense, as both sets of articles have
provisions for breaches of both a severe
and less serious nature. Equally significant is the fact that the range of penalties
for misconduct has been greatly widened,
making it more difficult to mete out appropriate disciplinary measures. The court
could find itself deciding these matters in
future cases.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers the International Criminal Court
for the Human Rights Brief.
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